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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
BETTY ANDERSON, and
DAVID PATRICK ALUMBAUGH
aka DAVID PATRICK
ANDERSON, his Guardian
Ad Litem,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
vs.
PARSON RED-E-MIX
PAVING COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and
MAX E. GREEN, et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.

Case No.
11,746

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries arising
out of an automobile-truck accident.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After hearing plaintiffs' case for two days and
allowing plaintiffs to make an additional proffer as
to additional proof they wished to offer, the lower
court directed a judgment in favor of the defendants
and respondents, no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants and respondents seek affirmance of
the judgment of the lower court.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellants' Statement of Facts is mcomplete and argumentative.
This accident happened shortly after 4 :00 p.m.
on a bright clear day. Immediately prior to the accident Max E. Green had delivered a load of concrete
to a Phillips 66 Station located on the northwest corner of the intersection of Fourth North and Main
Street in Brigham City, Utah. After completing the
delivery he pulled the Red-E-Mix concrete truck out
of the station and drove it to a position approximately 150 feet west of the west curb of Main Street and
parked it at the north edge of Fourth North Street
(R. 101). While Max Green, the truck driver, was
standing on the platform washing out the mixer
drum he heard the squealing of tires (R. 55). Mr.
Green looked up and saw the Kim Mortensen vehicle
sliding sideways about 50 feet away (R. 55).
Defendants' Exhibit No. 8 shows the defendants' truck and the platform on which Max Green
was standing at the time of the accident.
The record does not show that Fourth North
Street narrows at the point of the accident. The evidence only shows that there was an asphalt apron
extending from the Phillips 66 Station to the edge of
the asphalt on the roadway immediately south of the
station and that thereafter to the west there was
gravel and no apron. The area of the accident is
clearly shown in defendants' Exhibits Nos. 5, 6 and
7 received without objection.
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The statement on page 4 of Appellants' Brief
that there was a false impression created by the narrowing of the roadway is argumentative as shown
by the aforementioned exhibits.
Kim Mortenson, the driver of the motor vehicle
in which the plaintiff was riding was 15 years old
on April 22, 1966 (R. 226). He stole the vehicle to
get possession of it (R. 227). He had had no driver
training instruction and no driver license ( R. 231).
When he started to make the turn he accelerated rapidly ( R. 232). He lost control during the turn and
went into slides and fishtails (R. 232, 233). First he
slid the rear of the car to the north, then overcorrected to the south, then went back to the north. When
he was out of control he did not apply his brakes (R.
233). When he was sliding out of control at a speed
of between 20 and 30 miles an hour he saw the truck
30 feet away ( R. 234). He never saw any east bound
traffic on Fourth North ( R. 234). He never saw the
chute on the rear of the truck (R. 235). Kim Mortenson admitted tha:t his automobile slid sideways a
little bit before it hit the truck (R. 235).
Defendants' Exhibit No. 9 shows the area of
impact on the vehicle in which plaintiff was riding.
Mr. Daines, trial counsel for the plaintiffs, stipulated that from 150 feet west of the west curb of
Main Street, Fourth North was zoned commercial
and that the remainder of the block west was zoned
residential R-3 ( R. 243).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
MAX GREEN WAS NOT NEGLIGENT.

At the trial appellants claimed Max Green was
negligent in two respects: First, they claimed he violatede §41-6-101 Utah Code Annotated 1953 in parking a vehicle on a roadway. Second, they claimed he
violated a Brigham City ordinance and a state statute, §41-6-128 Utah Code Annotated 1953, requiring
anyone with a load extending from a vehicle more
than 4 feet to have a warning flag.
Max Green did not violate §41-6-101 Utah Code
Annotated 1953. This statute (quoted in Appellants'
Brief on page 6) begins:
"Upon any highway outside of a business
or residence district no person shall stop, park,
or leave * * *" (Emphasis added)
The record, including the exhibits, shows there
was a gas station just a few feet east of the accident
on the north side of Fourth North and that there was
a construction company office immediately north of
the point of impact.
This accident happened in Brigham City. It occurred in a residential or commercial zone as shown
by Mr. Daines' stipulation. A Philips 66 Service Station and Whitaker Construction Company operated
businesses on Fourth North. When counsel for the appellants refers to a vacant graveled lot used to park
equipment on page 7 of his brief, he is admitting a
4

business use of property. It is an established fact that
the property adjacent to the accident was being used
to operate businesses. All reasonable persons considder service stations and construction companies as
businesses.
In suggesting, as appellants' counsel does on
page 7 in his brief, that Max Green was negligent in
violating §41-6-101 Utah Code Annotated 1953, because he could have driven back to Parson's yard in
ten minutes, he is talking about immaterial facts.
How long it would have taken Max Green to drive
back to Parson's yard is not competent evidence
to show he violated §41-6-101 Utah Code Annotated
1953. In substance, appellants' counsel is arguing
that Max Green was negligent because he did not
stay home. This is another form of the argument that
you were negligent because you drove on State Street
of
Street.
In deciding Hillyard vs. Utah By-Products Co.,
( 1953) 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287, this court did
not mention §41-6-101 Utah Code Annotated 1953.
Section 21-4-13 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake County, Utah, provides :
"Sec. 21-4-13. Parking Not to Obstruct
Traffic. No person shall park any vehicle
upon a street in such a manner or under such
conditions as to leave available less than ten
feet of the width of the roadway for free movement of vehicular traffic."
In the Hillyard case, 27th South Street at 480
5

East had a surf ace of 24 feet and a 12 foot lane for
traffic was provided in each direction. Utah ByProducts' driver parked a truck so that its rear end
extended out onto the paved portion 5 feet. Vaughn
Aston, the driver of the vehicle in which plaintiff's
son was riding, could not see the protruding truck
because of the vehicle ahead of him and crashed into
the protruding vehicle occupying 5 feet of his lane.
Under the Salt Lake County ordinance there is
a duty not to park a vehicle upon any street in the
county in such a manner as to leave available less
than 10 feet of the roadway for free movement of
traffic. Under §41-6-101 Utah Code Annotated you
are not forbidden to stop, park or leave a vehicle on a
highway within a business or residential district.
In residential and business districts it is the custom and practice to park on the pavement at the side
of the roadway. In these areas streets are of ten paved
from curb to curb. A vehicle parked at the edge of the
pavement in a business or residential area is one of
those conditions all reasonable men are expected to
anticipate. On the other hand, vehicles parked on the
pavement outside of business or residential areas are
not anticipated by reasonable men as it is not the customary practice to park on the pavement outside of
business or residential areas.
With respect to appellant's contentions that
Max Green violated §136 of the Brigham City ordinance and §41-6-128 Utah Code Annotated 1953, ap6

pellants' evidence failed to show a violation of either.
Section 136 states no person shall drive any vehicle with a load or object upon such vehicle extending 4 feet or more beyond the bed or body of said vehicle during the daytime without having a red flag
attached. The evidence in this case shows Max Green
was not driving a cement truck but in fact was standing on it while it was parked at the edge of the roadway washing out the mixing drum. Section 136 of
the Brigham City ordinance does not require a warning flag on a load or object protruding 4 feet or more
from a parked vehicle.
Section 41-6-128 requires whenever the load upon a vehicle extends to the rear 4 feet or more, a red
flag or cloth not less than 12 inches square be hung
so that the entire area is visible to the driver of avehicle approaching from the rear.
Kim Mortenson ran into a large red and white
ready-mix truck. He did not collide with a load on the
truck. As the evidence shows the vehicle in which the
plaintiff was riding collided with the rear of the cement truck and its chute and not with a load, this section is inapplicable by its very language.
POINT II.
THE NEGLIGENCE OF KIM MORTENSON
WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
THE ACCIDENT.

The appellants argue the lower court should
not have held as a matter of law the sole proxiimate
cause of the appellant's injuries was the negligence
7

of Kim Mortenson, the 15 year old driver of the vehicle in which David Anderson was riding. Accordingly, for the purpose of discussion, let us assume
that Max Green was negligent in parking the truck
so that the right rear duals encroached on the pavement and in failing to display a red warning flag and
consider whether or not his negligence in either respect was a proximate cause of the accident of which
plaintiffs complain.
In Hillyard vs. Utah By-Products, supra, this
court set out guide lines to use in determining what
the proximate cause of an accident was. In Hillyard
the court said :
"In applying the test of foreseeability to
situations where a negligently created preexisting condition combines with a later act
of negligence causing an injury, the courts
have drawn a clear-cut distinction between two
classes of cases. The first situation is where
one has negligently created a dangerous condition (such as parking the truck) and a later
actor observed, or circumstances are such that
he could not fail to observe, but negligently
failed to avoid it. The second situation involves
conduct of a later intervening actor who negligently failed to observe the dangerous condition until it is too late to avoid it. In regard to
the first situation it is held as a matter of law
that the later intervening act does interrupt
the natural sequence of events and cut off the
legal effect of the negligence of the initial actor. This is based upon the reasoning that it
is not reasonably to be foreseen nor expected
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that one who actually becomes cognizant of a
dangerous condition in ample time to avert injury will fail to do so."
The Hillyard case involved a fact situation
which fitted into the second category above where
the negligent second actor failed to observe the condition until it was too late to avoid a collision.
On the other hand, in the present case there is no
allegation and the facts show that the cement truck
was not hidden and that Kirn Mortenson could clearly
have seen it before he turned from Main Street onto
Fourth North to go west. This case fits in the first
category of cases mentioned in Hillyard and the negligence of Kirn Mortenson was an intervening act
which interrupted the natural sequence of events and
cut off the legal effect of the negligence, if any, if
Max Green.
In McMurdie vs. Underwood, (1959) 9 Utah 2d
400, 346 P.2d 711, this court said:
"It does not seem unreasonable to conclude that one who approaches a dangerous
condition, created by the negligence of another,
and either sees it or circumstances are such
that one must see it in time to avoid danger,
and fails to do so, becomes the sole proximate
cause of any damage or injury caused thereby."

Velasquez vs. Greyhound Lines, Inc., ( 1961) 12
Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 989, from a factual standpoint, is the closest case in point. In this case a colli9

sion occurred on Interstate 80 in southwestern Wyoming. The hard surface of the westbound lanes included two 12 foot traffic lanes, a 4 foot shoulder on
the inside (south) and a 10 foot emergency pull out
strip on the outside (north). James Buckley, traveling west, pulled his car off the highway in the emergency strip on the north side because of tire trouble
and sought help from passing motorists. An Interstate Motor Lines truck stopped beside Buckley, partially in the 10 foot emergency lane but with its back
end protruding approximately 7 feet into the outside
westbound lane. The truck driver left clearance lights
on and the driver of the Greyhound Lines bus observed the truck three-fourths of a mile away and realized it and the Buckley vehicle were stopped. The bus
driver intended to stop behind the truck 'to render
assistance even though there was plenty of room for
him to have passed in the inside westbound lane.
Thereafter, momentarily the bus driver lost consciousness, either blacking out or falling asleep, and did
not wake up until a woman passenger shouted a
warning, ''Don't hit it." The bus driver swerved to
his left but could not avoid a collision. Velasquez, the
plaintiff, was a passenger in the Greyhound hus and
the action was brought against Interstate Motor
Lines, its driver and Greyhound Lines, Inc. and its
driver. The lower court held that as a matter of law
the negligence of the bus driver was the sole proximate cause of the collision.
In the Velasquez case in affirming a judgment
10

n.o.v. in favor of the trucking company, the court
said:
"We quite agree with the proposition that
where one has negligently created a condition
of danger he is not relieved of responsibility
for damage it causes to another merely because
the injury also involved the later misconduct
of someone else. But this is true only if both
negligent acts are in fact concurring proximate causes of the injury; and it is not true
if the later negligence is an independent, intervening sole proximate cause of the incident."
"In Hillyard vs. Utah By-Products Co.,
we had occasion to consider the problem of
proximate cause in another case where defendant's truck had been parked protruding onto
the highway and was run into by a car in
which the person injured was a guest passenger. It was held that under the particular fact
situation the prior negligent parking of the defendant's truck could reasonably be found to
be a concurring proximate cause of the collision. The deceased was a guest in a car being
negligently driven; the driver veered to his left
in attempting to pass a car ahead; saw a car
coming from the other direction; then moved
back into his own lane just as the car ahead
swerved to its left to miss the parked truck,
thus leaving the driver suddenly confronting
the parked truck when it was too late to avoid
it. We held that in this emergency situation
the prior negligent parking of the truck setting up the hazard could reasonably be found
to be a concurring proximate cause with the
negligence of the driver in producing the in11

jury. But we also pointed out that even where
there is a negligently created hazard (Interstate parking the truck) and a later actor
(Greyhound) observed, or circumstances were
such that he could not fail to observe, the condition, but he nevertheless negligently failed
to avoid it, the latter negligence would be an
independent, intervening cause and therefore
the sole proximate cause of the accident.
"In determining whether the negligence
in creating a hazard ( Interstate's parking the
truck) was a proximate cause of the collision,
this is the test to be applied; did the wrongful
act, in a natural and continuous sequence of
events which might reasonably be expected to
follow, produce the injury. If so, it can be said
to be a concurring proximate cause of the injury even though the later negligent act of another (Greyhound) cooperated to cause it. On
the other hand, if the latter's act of negligence
in causing the collision was of such character
as not reasonably to be expected to happen in
the natural sequence of events, then such later
act of negligence is the independent, intervening cause and therefore the sole proximate
cause of the injury.
"Applying the foregoing test 'to our situation: we think it is not reasonably to be foreseen that an oncoming driver (Greyhound)
would see (or fail to see) this large, well-lighted truck so parked up on the highway, and
with at least one and one-half useable traffic
lanes to his left, nevertheless run into it. The
trial court was correct in so concluding and
entering a judgment in favor of Interstate
Motor Lines as a matter of law on the ground
that 'the negligence of Greyhound was the sole
12

proximate cause of the collision." (Emphasis
added)
This case is similar to the Velasquez case. If, for
the sake of discussion we assume Max Green was negligent in parking the cement truck with the left rear
duals partially on the roadway, nevertheless the trial
court was justified in finding that the negligence of
Kim Mortenson was the sole proximate cause of the
collision. The truck, a large red and white ready-mix
truck, was parked at least 150 feet west of the west
curb of Main Street on Fourth North, a straight and
level road. The accident occurred about 4 :15 p.m. in
broad daylight. Fourth North Street was paved approximately 27 feet wide. There was no oncoming
traffic and even if 2 feet of the truck were on the
pavement, there was 25 feet of useable roadway to
the left of the ready-mix truck. In the ordinary
course of events it is not reasonable to believe that
an oncoming driver would fail to see this large
red and white ready-mix truck until he was within
30 feet of it and that if the truck driver had had a red
flag tied onto the chute, a collision could have been
avoided. It is not reasonable to assume that Green
should have foreseen that a 15 year old driver would
come around the turn at high speed, out of control
and fishtailing and that he would slide sideways into
the rear of the truck.
Kim Mortenson's negligent conduct constituted
an independent, intervening cause and was, therefore, the sole proximate cause of the accident and in13

juries resulting even if you assume negligence on the
part of Max Green.
CONCLUSION

The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed because:
1. The evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, including the additional proffered evidence, failed to
show as a matter of law Max Green was negligent.

2. The evidence showed as a matter of law the
sole proximate cause of the accident in question and
resulting injuries was the negligence of Kim Mortenson.
Respectfully submitted,
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN
RAYMOND M. BERRY
Seventh Floor Continental
Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Respondents

MAILING NOTICE
I hereby certify by United States Mail, postage prepaid,
I mailed two copies of the foregoing brief to Dale M. Dorius,
Attorney at Law, 29 South Main Street, Brigham City, Utah
84302 this ________________ day of January, 1970.
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